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This paper  presents  an  index  that  measures  reviewer  contribution  to editorial  processes
of  scholarly  journals.  Following  a metaphor  of ranking  algorithms  in  sports  tournaments,
we  created  an index  that considers  reviewers  on  different  context-speciﬁc  dimensions,  i.e.,
report  delivery  time,  the  length  of the  report  and  the alignment  of  recommendations  to  edi-
torial decisions.  To  test  the  index,  we  used  a dataset  of  peer  review  in a multi-disciplinary
journal,  including  544  reviewers  on 606 submissions  in  six  years.  Although  limited  by
sample  size,  the test  showed  that  the  index  identiﬁes  outstanding  contributors  and  weak
performing  reviewers  efﬁciently.  Our  index  is ﬂexible,  contemplates  extensions  and  could
be  incorporated  into  available  scholarly  journal  management  tools.  It can  assist  editors  in
rewarding  high  performing  reviewers  and  managing  editorial  turnover.
©  2018  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Most academics consider reviewing for journals a fundamental part of their professional work. Not only is it rewarding
when editors consider us as an authoritative expert in our ﬁeld, sometimes reviewing is also accepted for moral reasons,
i.e., to comply with social norms characterizing the scientiﬁc community (Lamont, 2012; Warne, 2016).
However, reality often works against good intentions. Indeed, reviewing is time consuming and there is a trade-off with
other activities, such as preparing grant proposals, lecturing or preparing submissions of journal articles (Bianchi, Grimaldo,
Bravo, & Squazzoni, 2018). The fact that reviewing is not recognized for grants and professional career advancement as well
as being a voluntary effort which is potentially over-exploitable and sometimes not reciprocated by others, does not help
(Tennant et al., 2017; Veríssimo & Roberts, 2013).
However, journal editors know that the reputation of their journal greatly depends on reviewers. On the one hand, the
reliability of peer review increases journal legitimacy when authors often see their manuscripts evolving and improving
after rounds of reviews (Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, Dondio, & Squazzoni, 2017a,b; Rigby, Cox, & Julian, 2018). On the other,
reviewers would beneﬁt from the recognition of their effort either by journals, funding agencies or research institutions
(Kachewar & Sankaye, 2013). In this respect, while reviewing is a fundamental step towards academic learning and respon-
sible scholarship, receiving a generic e-mail of thanks or having our name included in the list of journal reviewers published
in the latest issue has little real value either symbolically or materially. It is worth noting that recent research has suggested
that reputational incentives for peer reviewer should be increased, as while this does not nurture short-term material inter-
ests it could have potential long-term material consequences in terms of academic recognition (Mulligan, Hall, & Raphael,
2013; Squazzoni, Bravo, & Takács, 2013; Warne, 2016).
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Here, the problem is that recognizing reviewers requires systematic effort of quantifying and comparing a complex,
ontext-speciﬁc, and widespread activity. Not surprisingly, these are rarely performed by journals (Margalida & Colomer,
016; Siler, Lee, & Bero, 2015), while available recognition platforms, such as Elsevier Reviewer Recognition and Publons,
alue quantity (i.e., the number of reviews) over other dimensions. Although previous research has suggested the need for
eveloping indices to quantify reviewer effort (Cantor & Gero, 2015; Kachewar & Sankaye, 2013; Veríssimo & Roberts, 2013),
o our knowledge, there is no example of an index that looks at multiple dimensions or that has been tested on a journal
ataset.
To ﬁll this gap, we present here an index that considers reviewing as a measurable activity whose outcomes can be rated,
ross-compared and ranked. Following the sports’ analogy, we considered two or more reviewers assigned to the same
anuscript as match players who compete to deliver a pertinent, informative and timely review (Langville & Meyer, 2012).
iven that any submission is potentially different from another in length, depth and required effort, we  compared reviewers
n the same context so that their performance was relative and context-speciﬁc, in order to establish a level playing ﬁeld.
ndeed, we would never see Ivan Lendl, a top player in the 1980s playing against Roger Federer in a tennis tournament or
ompare the performance of Federer in a ﬁrst round of a satellite tournament against the number 100 of the ATP ranking with
is achievement in a Wimbledon gentlemen’s singles ﬁnal against Rafael Nadal, his most legendary opponent and former
umber 1 of the ATP ranking.
It is important to note that we are not interested in estimating the quality of reviewers. Considering quality would
equire deﬁning what quality in peer review actually is, which is a difﬁcult task (Cowley, 2015). Not only is quality a slippery
oncept hardly quantiﬁable and standardizable; peer review can also have multiple purposes for whoever is involved. For
nstance, besides being only a quality screening mechanism, it can also be viewed as a process that is expected to increase the
nowledge value of manuscripts (Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, Dondio, et al., 2017a,b; Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, & Squazzoni,
017). Here, we wanted to consider reviewer performance on certain factors valuable for editors and journals (and indirectly
or authors) that can be fully quantiﬁed and compared.
For this purpose, we developed an algorithm that rates and ranks reviewers by jointly considering three factors: (1) report
elivery time, (2) length of reports and (3) recommendation (Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, Dondio, et al., 2017a,b; Hartonen
 Alava, 2013; Laband, 1990). This does not mean that other factors or dimensions are irrelevant. We  have proposed a tool
hat could be adapted to context-speciﬁc interests of editors and journals, as well as to the quality of available data.
Furthermore, we did not aim to identify a ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ methodology that could reﬂect context-speciﬁc journal char-
cteristics and include varying dimensions. Note that we  aggregated the scores of each reviewer in each dimension as in
 sports tournament to generate a comprehensive ranking of reviewers’ performance only as an illustrative example. We
elieve that such an exercise could stimulate extensions and implementations, thus enriching the depth, representativeness
nd ﬂexibility of the index.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section presents our rating and ranking algorithm while
ection 3 presents a test of our algorithm on a dataset of reviews for a scientiﬁc journal. Finally, in Section 4 we draw some
onclusions and discuss limitations of our study.
. The method
.1. Computing reviewer ratings
In an inﬂuential contribution, Keener (1993) proposed a method to calculate numerical ratings of football teams with
ncomplete matching. His algorithm used non-negative statistics from contests to generate a ranking of teams based on
atings ordering, which included non-evenly matched pairings. The idea was that any contest participant could have assigned
 rating measuring his/her absolute strength that depended on his/her relative strength, which in turn reﬂected the strength
f each opponent with which he/she was matched. Therefore, each contest participant’s rating depended on interaction
utcome and the strength of participants. In his inspiration, these computational efforts were intended to question the
alidity of intuitions and subjective impressions, while showing the advantages of objective performance measures. It is
orth noting that Keener’s method has been applied to a variety of ﬁelds, including meteorology (Christy, Norris, Redmond,
 Gallo, 2006), the study of animal social hierarchies (Bush, Quinn, Balreira, & Johnson, 2016), the ranking of web  pages by
opularity (Franceschet, 2011) and group-ranking aggregation in management science (Hochbaum & Levin, 2006).
Here, we adapted Keener’s method to develop a rating and ranking algorithm for reviewers of scholarly journals. We
onsidered reviewers as participants of a tournament in which each reviewer was  matched over time with others as they
ere assigned to evaluate the same manuscripts. Similarly to participants in a tournament, reviewers’ strength can be
easured by calculating a rating based on their reviewing behaviour, by measuring it together with the behaviour of other
eviewers assigned to the same manuscripts and their strength.
Coherently with Keener’s idea, we deﬁne the relationship between strength and rating as follows: the strength of a reviewer (si) can be assessed through i’s reviewing behaviour compared to the strength of other reviewers
matched with i;
 the rating of a reviewer ri is uniformly proportional to its strength si, such that ∀i, si = ri, with  being constant for all
reviewers.
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The ﬁrst assumption reﬂects the idea that manuscripts vary in terms of length and technical difﬁculties of the text so that
different efforts are implied by reviewers. Returning to the sports analogy, today it is harder to play against Roger Federer
than against Ivan Lendl who would soon be turning 60. Similarly, comparing the performance of a serve and volley tennis
player in a competition on a grass court with a red-clay court tournament is not very informative. Therefore, we estimated
the strength of each reviewer by considering the context, thus comparing reviewers of the same manuscript. Let us assume
that an editor assigns two different manuscripts to reviewers (i, j) and (y, z) respectively. Let us also assume that the ﬁrst
manuscript is more complicated to review than the latter. Then, the strength of reviewer i can be best assessed by comparing
his/her behaviour to j’s rather than to y or z, who  are assigned a manuscript that is less difﬁcult to review.
Following Keener’s method, we propose to assess si by measuring one or more attributes of i’s behaviour when evaluating
the same manuscript as j (e.g., the report length). In order to measure an attribute aij, we  calculate the value of a non-negative
statistic Sij, i.e., a statistical value representing an attribute of i’s behaviour in the evaluation of the same manuscripts reviewed
by j (e.g., the number of words contained in the report text). Following a consolidate practice (Langville & Meyer, 2012), in
case of multiple matchings of the same reviewers i and j, Sij is equal to the sum of all values across various manuscripts.
Given that manuscripts can vary considerably in certain structural characteristics (e.g., text length, employed methods,
etc.,), the distribution of statistics for the selected attributes could vary considerably between different reviewers. In order
to control for this, we calculate attribute measurements by standardizing raw statistics. Then, following a recommendation
by Keener (1993), we transform standardized statistics by applying Laplace’s Rule of Succession (1995 [1825]) in order to
avoid ‘winner-takes-all’ effects, as follows:
aij =
Sij + 1
Sij + Sji + 2
. (1)
For instance, let us assume that i reviewed two  manuscripts which were also assigned to j. Then, suppose that i delivered
two reports consisting of 500 and 650 words each, while j’s review reports consisted of 200 and 250 words, respectively. In
this case, Sij = 500 + 650 and Sji = 200 + 250, hence
aij =
(500 + 650) + 1
(500 + 650) + (200 + 250) + 2 ≈ 0.718.
Let us now assume that i delivered his/her report after 10 and 15 days each, while j took 11 and 25 days. As quicker
responses are preferable here, we use the numbers of the opponent as a convenient statistic. Then, Sij = 11 + 25 and Sji = 10 + 15,
and
aij =
(11 + 25) + 1
(11 + 25) + (10 + 15) + 2 ≈ 0.587.
We then distribute the obtained attribute values into a square matrix
A = [aij]m×m, (2)
where m is the number of reviewers of the considered journal.
Considering rj as the numerical rating of reviewer j and building on Assumption 1, we assume that
sij = aij rj, (3)
where the relative strength of reviewer i with respect to j (sij) is yielded by measuring the attribute of i’s behaviour as reviewer
of the same manuscripts reviewed by j, weighted by the rating of j.
We therefore deﬁne the absolute strength of reviewer i as the sum of i’s relative strengths compared to all other reviewers,
as follows:
si =
m∑
j=1
sij =
m∑
j=1
aijrj. (4)
Then, we deﬁne a strength vector for all reviewers as:
s =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s2
...
sm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
j
a1jrj
∑
j
a2jrj
...∑
amjrj
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a11 a12 · · · a1m
a21 a22 · · · a2m
...
... · · ·
...
am1 am2 · · · amm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
r1
r2
...
rm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= Ar (5)j
By considering Assumption 2 and Eq. (5), it follows that
Ar = r. (6)
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Table  1
Parameters of the F3-index: reviewers’ attributes and related statistics.
Attributes (a) Statistics (S)
l Report length Number of words contained in reviewers’ reports
c
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at  Delivery time Number of days between acceptance to review and report delivery
e  Alignment of editorial decision to reviewer
recommendation
Number of events in which the editorial decision was equal to a
reviewer’s recommendation
Therefore, by calculating the r vector, we derive the rating of each reviewer on attribute a. It is worth noting that these
omputations can be performed by applying a power algorithm, as in Algorithm 1, on condition that A complies with the
rinciples of non-negativity, irreducibility, and primitivity (see Meyer, 2000).
lgorithm 1. Pseudocode to calculate the rating vectors
nput: Number of reviewers (m), Attribute-value matrix (A), Convergence criterion ()
utput: Ratings vector (r)
: r−1 ←− 0
:  r ←− 1/m · eT
: while max(|r − r−1|) >  do
:  r−1 ←− r
:  r ←− Ar/
∑m
i=1(Ar)i
: end while
.2. Computing the F3-index
Following this method, various attributes can be used to rate the performance of journal reviewers, by calculating appro-
riate statistics. Here, we  followed previous attempts at measuring important characteristics of peer review reports and
oncentrated on three dimensions (Ellison, 2002; Hartonen & Alava, 2013; Laband, 1990).
First, we consider the report length as a proxy of the amount of information provided by the reviewer to editors and
uthors (Bravo, Farjam, Grimaldo, Birukou, & Squazzoni, 2018; Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, Dondio, et al., 2017; Laband, 1990).
e assume that a detailed report is not only expected to include more valuable information that helps editors to judge the
uality, rigour and validity of a manuscript; it can also provide insights for authors to improve their work. Secondly, we
onsider the time taken by the reviewer to return the report. Indeed, minimizing delivery time is key to reduce time wasted
y editors to chase reviewers and secure supplementary reports, while beneﬁting authors by reducing publication delay
Chetty, Saez, & Sandor, 2014). Finally, we look at the alignment of editorial decisions to reviewer recommendations. We
onsider this as a proxy of the inﬂuence of the reviewer on the editor’s opinion (Kravitz et al., 2010). In this respect, it is worth
oting that not only could editors proﬁt from understanding more systematically which reviewers were more inﬂuential on
heir own decisions, certain editors may  want to select reviewers with different opinions and attitudes. Balancing reviewers
ith different attitudes and exploiting their diversity to deliver a sound justiﬁed report to authors are one of the trade secrets
f any good editor but could be supported more efﬁciently by systematic use of internal journal data.
More speciﬁcally, we create parameters for our index on three attributes: report length,  delivery time, and alignment
f editorial decision to reviewer recommendation. Each attribute is measured through appropriate statistics, as reported in
able 1:
By choosing a relevant set of statistics, the algorithm can be parameterised against different dimensions, so that different
ating vectors are computed, one for each attribute, as speciﬁed in Section 2.1. The F3-index is generated by aggregating
ach reviewer’s different attribute-speciﬁc rates into a synthetic rating value.
Of the varying methods used to aggregate different rankings (Lin, 2010), heuristic algorithms are the most appropriate
or a small number of long attribute-speciﬁc rating lists. They range from simple arithmetic ranking averages to Markov
hains. The latter have been used to generate right-skewed ratings focused on the top of the rank, but are less accurate at
ssigning positions at the bottom. Given that the aim of the F3-index was to consider both aspects, we  aggregate the different
ttribute-speciﬁc ratings by standardizing them and calculating the mean of the obtained values for each reviewer.
Therefore, being n = 3 the number of different attribute-speciﬁc ratings (r1, r2, . . .,  rn), the F3-Index of each reviewer can
e calculated as follows:
F3i =
1
n
n∑
k=1
rk,i − rk
3rk
(7)
. An applicationWe  tested the F3-index by applying it to a dataset of reviewers of the Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (from
ow on, JASSS). JASSS is an open-access, online interdisciplinary journal which publishes applications of computer simulation
o the understanding of social dynamics and processes. The multi-disciplinary character of JASSS was instrumental to provide
 robust test of our algorithm, which is useful especially to compare reviewers with different backgrounds and skills (see
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Fig. 1. Distributions of Report length and delivery time with mean (vertical solid lines) and standard deviation (vertical dashed lines) values.
Table 2
Reviewers’ recommendations and editorial decisions: relative frequencies.
Level Reviewer’s recommendation Editorial decision
Accept 6.68% 0.00%
Minor revision 26.03% 26.94%Revise and resubmit 40.65% 46.94%
Reject 26.63% 26.13%
Casnici, Grimaldo, Gilbert, & Squazzoni, 2017; Hauke, Lorscheid, & Meyer, 2017; Squazzoni & Casnici, 2013 and Squazzoni
and Casnici, 2013 for an overview on the journal and its reviewers).
The dataset included information on the ﬁrst round of evaluation of 606 submitted manuscripts which passed the editorial
rejection desk between 2005 and 2011. Considering that the journal strictly follows double-blind peer review, but each
reviewer also receives all review reports included in the editorial notiﬁcation letter to the authors, restricting data to the
ﬁrst round of reviews permitted us to avoid any learning or imitation effect between reviewers (Bravo et al., 2018). We
removed all review guidelines and introductory comments from each review report and extracted the text from the journal
template, which included instructions on how to perform reports. Each manuscript was assigned to at least two reviewers,
with a total number of m = 544 reviewers and k = 995 matched pairs. Note that if a paper was assigned to more than two
reviewers, we used all different reviewer pairs to calculate the ratings. Note that we  excluded manuscripts reviewed directly
by the journal editor from the dataset so to prevent bias in the alignment rating.
The computation of the F3-index was possible because the dataset complied with the required conditions mentioned
in Section 2.1. More speciﬁcally, 501 out of 544 reviewers (92.1%) were indirectly connected with each other by a chain
of co-reviewed manuscripts. This allowed us to build sufﬁciently irreducible non-negative matrices A1, A2, and A3 for the
three parameters. Moreover, 69.21% of all possible chains of manuscripts connecting reviewers had a length between 4 and
6. This meant that most reviewers were connected by a similar number of co-reviewed manuscripts and that the primitivity
condition was  sufﬁciently met  to calculate the rating vectors as presented in Section 2.1.
Submitted reports had an average length of approximately 400.1 words (SD = 248.56) and distribution of the report
length (l) was approximately uniform for reviewers (see Fig. 1a). The mean delivery time (t) between reviewers’ acceptance
notiﬁcation and report submission was 28.08 days (SD = 24.11). Unlike the report length,  the distribution of t was right-
skewed, ranging up to a maximum of 187 days (see Fig. 1b).
Along with the report text, reviewers were required to give a recommendation concerning the ﬁnal publication decision,
which could be in four categories: “Accept”, “Minor revision”, “Revise and resubmit” (or “Major revision”), or “Reject”, which
were the same used by the editor for authors’ notiﬁcations. Table 2 reports the distribution of reviewer recommendations
to the editor and the ﬁnal editorial decisions. The two distributions were positively correlated (V = 0.47, 95% CI: [0.44, 0.50]).
“Revise and resubmit” (from here on, “R&R”) was prevalent among both reviewer recommendations and editorial deci-
sions (46.94% of manuscripts). It is worth noting that manuscripts for which reviewers recommended the same evaluation
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Table  3
Anonymized results of the application of the F3-index on the JASSS dataset. rl , rt and re report the rating of the reviewers with respect to report length,  delivery
time,  and alignment with the editorial decision. # l , # t and # e report the grouped ranking of the reviewers on each of the previous attributes, delivery time,
and  alignment with the editorial decision. ki reports the number of pair matches between the reviewer and another reviewer. l¯i andt¯i , report the reviewers’
mean values of report length and delivery time. e¯i reports reviewers’ proportions of alignment of their recommendations with the editorial decision.
# Name F3 # l rl # t rt # e re ki l¯i t¯i e¯i
1 Lorem Ipsum 0.857 4 0.458 1 1.388 3 0.725 12 480 9.7 0.67
2  Fusce At 0.840 1 1.699 3 0.823 6 -0.001 16 661 19.4 0.75
3  Vestibulum Sit 0.794 5 0.250 1 1.609 4 0.524 12 509 3.1 0.92
4  Aenean Eget 0.757 4 0.425 2 1.241 4 0.605 8 518 5.1 1
5  Vivamus Ac 0.537 4 0.425 1 1.893 8 -0.706 30 469 13.4 0.60
6  Praesent Vitae 0.528 2 1.154 5 0.228 5 0.202 9 714 28.4 0.67
7  Fusce Quis 0.527 5 0.287 3 0.892 4 0.402 9 478 11.1 0.78
8  Donec Egestas 0.525 2 1.191 6 -0.017 4 0.401 9 586 24.8 0.67
9  Aliquam Ac 0.479 4 0.409 5 0.223 3 0.806 4 395 26.3 1
10  Vivamus Viverra 0.459 3 0.773 4 0.603 6 0 4 649 6.5 0.75
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
535  Morbi Lectus −0.436 5 0.004 8 −0.706 7 −0.605 8 491 61.9 0.25
536  Morbi pulvinar −0.451 8 −0.678 8 −0.673 6 0 4 151 50.5 0.50
537  Quisque Congue −0.461 5 0.225 7 −0.600 9 −1.007 6 596 38.2 0.17
358  Quisque Iaculis −0.473 7 −0.601 8 −0.817 6 −0.001 8 254 35.6 0.50
539  Vivamus Auctor −0.474 6 −0.330 6 −0.285 8 −0.806 4 180 19.0 0
540  Mauris Id −0.477 9 −1.042 7 −0.589 5 0.201 7 140 95.3 0.71
541  Nulla Eu −0.522 7 −0.472 6 −0.287 8 −0.806 8 290 35.1 0.25
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t542  Nullam Vel −0.558 5 0.131 8 −0.798 9 −1.007 6 485 70.3 0
543  Ut Scelerisque −0.600 9 −1.287 8 −0.715 5 0.202 6 80 37.3 0.67
544  Cras Mattis −0.733 7 −0.443 8 −0.751 9 −1.007 9 246 40.8 0.11
ccounted for 37.89% of the total, most frequently suggesting “R&R”. In case of equal recommendation by two  review-
rs, the editor followed their recommendations 89.39% of times (33.87% of the total). Finally, 59.30% of editorial decisions
orresponded to at least one reviewer recommendation.
In order to check whether report length,  delivery time, and alignment were actually measuring three different dimensions
f reviewer behaviour, we checked possible correlations between them. We  found no evidence of any linear correlation
etween report length and delivery time (r =−0.04, 95% CI: [−0.08, 0.00]). Furthermore, analysis of variance reported very
mall effects of reviewers’ recommendations on report length (2 = 0.014, 95% CI: [0.005, 0.025]) and delivery time (2 = 0.004,
5% CI: [0.000, 0.010]).
Table 3 reports the F3-indices of the 10 top and least rated reviewers. The ranking was  obtained by simply sorting
he F3-index distribution by decreasing order and ratings were calculated using Algorithm 1 with a convergence criterion
f  = 10−16. Results were anonymized in order to protect the reviewers’ identity. Due to the mathematical properties of
eener’s method on which our algorithm is based, the distance between two adjacent ranking positions are not uniform
cross the whole distribution. This implies that the difference between the F3-index of two adjacently ranked reviewers
ends to decrease as long as the pair approaches the mean value of the distribution. For instance, the distance between
eviewers number 1 and 2 will be higher than that of reviewers 200 and 201, as the normal distribution of the F3-index is
apped on a linear vector in order to generate a ranking.
Fig. 2a shows the distribution of the F3-index of reviewers. The index is approximately normally distributed with zero
ean and a standard deviation of F3 = 0.192. As a consequence of Eq. (1), each newly added reviewer was located around
he mean of the distribution to move towards the head or the tail when matched with other reviewers. Fig. 2b shows
he standardized attribute ratings that were averaged to obtain the F3-index. For illustrative purposes only, we followed
untsberger’s (1962) rule to discretize ratings into 10 intervals1 of similar rankings based on multiples of the standard
eviation. Following this partition, columns # l, # t and # e in Table 3 show the grouped ranking of the reported reviewers
or the three attribute-speciﬁc ratings: report length,  delivery time, and alignment with the editorial decision, respectively. It
s worth noting that while this permits an easy outlook, our ranking was sufﬁciently ﬂexible to add or delete any attribute
hat is considered relevant, as well as to look at individual attributes separately.
Table 3 shows that our algorithm generated rating scores which did not overlap the raw statistics of attributes used to
arameterize the algorithm, although they did partially correlate. The correlation was moderate with reviewers’ average
eport length l¯i (r = 0.34, 95% CI: [0.27, 0.41]) and average delivery time t¯i ( =−0.37, 95% CI: [−0.43, − 0.29]), while it was
elatively strong with the average alignment to editorial decision e¯i ( = 0.50, 95% CI: [0.44, 0.56]). We  also did not ﬁnd any
orrelation with reviewers’ pair matches ki ( = 0.01, 95% CI: [−0.08, 0.10]).
The F3-index is sufﬁciently robust to generate stable orderings in the presence of low and even moderate variability in
he attributes that map  reviewer behaviour. Fig. 3 shows the Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcients under two scenarios,
1 The number of intervals to discretize a continuous variable (m = 544 reviewer ratings) can be estimated using the rule of Huntsberger as 1 + 3.3 log10 ≈ 10.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of the F3-index and of the standardized attribute ratings.
Fig. 3. Robustness check for the F3-index. Error bars are plotted for 100 runs of each conﬁguration.i.e., when variations affected only one random attribute or all attributes (i.e. l, t or e). The small error bars show the stability
of the results for 100 runs of each experiment. Fig. 3a shows that correlation values were strong even for a high percentage
of variation and noise level (expressed as a percentage of the maximum value for each attribute). This would corroborate
the robustness of the F3-index, as it combines a set of attribute-speciﬁc ratings that overcome local variations. Furthermore,
when variation affects all attributes (see Fig. 3b), correlation values decreased with the percentage of variation, while the
level of noise increased.
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. Conclusions
Thanks to the digitalization of scientiﬁc records, rankings have been increasingly used in assessment of research per-
ormance at various levels and for different purposes (Bonaccorsi & Cicero, 2016; Dunaiski, Geldenhuys, & Visser, 2018).
ere, we presented an index that ranks and rates reviewers in academic journals and used internal journal data to test it.
e wanted to compare the relative performance strength of reviewers on three dimensions, i.e., the report delivery time,
he length of the report and the alignment of their recommendations to editorial decisions. Rather than measuring only the
umber of reviews, our index considered these multiple dimensions either separately or jointly.
The choice of dimensions and parameters reﬂected previous attempts at quantifying reviewer performance (Casnici,
rimaldo, Gilbert, Dondio, et al., 2017; Hartonen & Alava, 2013; Laband, 1990). However, it must be noted that our index is
exible and easily extendable to other dimensions while parameters could be weighted differently depending on the journal
ontext and available data. For instance, following recent innovations by Publons and expected technological progress in
ditorial journal management systems, it would be feasible to improve the index by including author and/or editor ratings of
eviewer reports, as well as applying and sharing it in a bunch of linked/sister journals. Considering the increasing number of
ublications and journals and the imbalance of the reviewing distribution effort, any improvement of reviewer recognition
ervices is essential – in our opinion – to improve the sustainability of peer review as a whole (Dean & Forray, 2018; Kovanis,
orcher, Ravaud, & Trinquart, 2016; Tennant et al., 2017).
Regarding its potential use by journal editors, our index could identify and recognize the most active reviewers, who could
e awarded by symbolic incentives. For example, rather than a generic e-mail of thanks, a list publishing top reviewers in
he journal website could be more valuable for reviewers’ reputation, especially when they are not editorial board members.
n this respect, the index could be also used to manage a journal’s editorial turnover, by co-opting new members based
n performance. Here, by working with multiple dimensions and using internal statistics, journals could avoid nurturing
cholars’ competitive spirits and gaming temptations, which are often intrinsic to any formalized ranking and quantiﬁcation
Seeber, Cattaneo, Meoli, & Malighetti, 2017).
Furthermore, once updated regularly, the index could inform editors on reviewer selection, by supporting a more appro-
riate match between reviewers and task. For instance, considering submissions by prestigious authors, an editor could be
nterested in maximizing the editorial quality of the process by selecting reviewers who  are more proliﬁc and detailed in
heir report and frequently aligned with their decisions, while at the same time neglecting turnaround time. In other cir-
umstances, for instance when submission authors are early career researchers, an editor could be also interested to reduce
urnaround time, while at the same time ensuring informative reports that could help authors improve their manuscript.
bviously, this would require constant updates, which could be problematic for certain journals.
It should be noted that our work has also important limitations. First, although our index is ﬂexible and adaptable, there
re intrinsic limits in quantifying certain qualitative dimensions of peer review (Cowley, 2015). For example, our index
hould not be used to examine the quality of peer review comprehensively, as this would require discussing what quality is
nd for what purpose it is relevant for. As already mentioned, the index is only useful to rank performance on quantiﬁable
actors and identify outstanding cases, while careful attention must be paid on conceptual frameworks to inform parameter
hoices (Subochev, Aleskerov, & Pislyakov, 2018) and communication means in order to avoid any misuse either by editors
r reviewers.
Secondly, the index can neither substitute editorial intuitions and tacit knowledge on reviewer selection, nor can it fully
utomatize reviewer selection or recognition. We  considered it as a means to complement editorial judgement and help
ditors to monitor reviewer performance more systematically. At the same time, there is no doubt that the management
f journals could dramatically beneﬁt from more robust, internal data-driven analytics. Here, given the prominent role of
ublications for academic career and promotion and considering the inﬂuence and the role of journals, adopting more robust
ndicators to manage editorial processes should be considered as part of a journal’s responsibility and accountability.
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